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Abstract
In this paper we assume that a set X is partitioned into two in-
difference classes and study several ways in which this dichotomous
information can be extended, so as to obtain an ordering of the power
set of X. The axioms that we introduce enable such a partition of X
to be interpreted as being made out of “good” and “bad” objects. We
define a family of rules that naturally take into account the number of
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good objects and the number of bad objects, and provide axiomatic
characterizations of different rules in the family that fit into a variety
of decisional situations.
JEL Classification Number: D81.
Keywords: dichotomous preferences, ranking sets, infection, opportu-
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1 Introduction
In this paper we apply an axiomatic approach to the study of the question
of how a decision maker ranks sets of objects in contexts where the primitive
information held about them is dichotomous. By this we mean that the deci-
sion maker partitions the set of all objects into two indifference classes, and
considers only this information in order to evaluate and rank sets. As shown
below, the axioms that we introduce enable the partition to be reinterpreted
as consisting of “good” and “bad” objects.
Categorization, and in particular dichotomous categorization, is a well-
known phenomenon in cognitive and social psychology, especially since All-
port (1954). In general, it is understood that categorization helps to handle
and process information efficiently in numerous decision processes. As we il-
lustrate below, there is a considerable number of settings where both dichoto-
mous categorization and the ranking of sets on the basis of such dichotomous
partitions are compelling.
For instance, as extensively surveyed by Brams and Fishburn (2002),
dichotomous domains have been examined in the context of voting, and in
particular in the case of approval voting, where voting strategies are reported
precisely in the form of sets of (approved) candidates. In such a context
dichotomous domains turn out to have important theoretical implications
regarding, for example, sincere and strategy-proof voting.
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Similarly, in problems of the voting by committees type initially posed
by Barberà et al. (1991), the basic item of information concerns the voter’s
preferences over subsets of candidates, and as in approval voting it makes
full sense to think about situations where voters categorize candidates di-
chotomously, for example in terms of acceptable versus non-acceptable alter-
natives.
Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004) also study bilateral matchings where
each side partitions the set of potential partners into “acceptable” and “non-
acceptable” (for example, depending on whether they have certain skills or
qualifications). It is, for instance, easy to imagine many-to-one matching
problems, such as designing working teams, where preferences of the “one-
side” of the market over groups of candidates have to be derived from their
basic dichotomous preferences over single candidates. Furthermore, Barberà
et al. (2001), Dimitrov et al. (2007), Kasher and Rubinstein (1997), and
Samet and Schmeidler (2003) study society formation problems, in which the
distinction is between candidates who qualify for membership on the basis
of the opinion of a founder or member of the society - for example based on
religious or political principles - and those who do not qualify. In other cases,
the members of a society have to decide who is entitled to perform a certain
activity within the group, such as driving a car or teaching at a university.
Groups may also be evaluated from outside. For example, in a social
dilemma situation such as a public good game, an individual could evaluate
the convenience of joining alternative coalitions on the basis of his/her knowl-
edge regarding the existence of two possible types of agent in the coalitions:
cooperators and free-riders.1
1Our dichotomous approach obviously makes more sense (though not necessarily) when
agents have only two possible strategies, i.e. either to contribute a given amount of money,
level of effort, etc. or not to contribute at all, as in the standard prisoner’s dilemma or in
all-or-none public good games.
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The results of our approach can also be seen as a contribution to the
problem of ranking sets of objects in a context of choice under complete un-
certainty, or ignorance. In these problems, the probabilities of the outcomes
generated by each action are totally unknown or ignored. Therefore, each in-
dividual decision is simply described by the set of outcomes that it generates
(see, among others, Arlegi (2003, 2007), Barberà et al. (1984), Barberà and
Pattanaik (1984), Bossert et al. (2000) and Nitzan and Pattanaik (1984)).
If it is assumed that the future uncertain outcomes are dichotomous (as in
Bogomolnaia et al. (2005)) and that assumption is considered within an
environment of complete uncertainty, the problem to be analyzed collapses
again into the formal structure that we propose.
When evaluating the freedom of choice that an opportunity set provides
it is sometimes the case that there is a partition between opportunities that
increase the freedom of the agent and those that do not (see Romero-Medina
(2001)).
As can be seen, it is not difficult to imagine very diverse types of problem
that consist of evaluating sets of items on the basis of a dichotomous partition
of the set of single items. Further cases could be those of an individual or
group interested in evaluating sets of norms according to whether or not
they comply with a certain moral doctrine; a worker that has to decide
about alternative day/night shifts proposed by his/her employer; a company
that evaluates alternative suppliers of a certain component according to their
ratios of OK/NOK items delivered, etc.
As explained above, whatever the context considered, the basic specific
question that we ask is the following: under a setting where the preferences
over individual objects are dichotomous, how can this rudimentary informa-
tion about the preferences on a set of objects be meaningfully extended to
obtain an ordering of the power set of those objects? Section 2 below presents
the basic notation and definitions. We then answer this question in Section
4
3 by introducing three core axioms which are suitable under the different
contexts described above. These axioms naturally allow us to concentrate on
dichotomous preferences where the two types of object can be interpreted not
just as belonging to two indifferent classes but as good and bad, respectively.
It turns out that the requirements that we impose shape a specific family
of rules for ranking sets in our dichotomous environment. In Section 4 we
then present axiomatic characterizations of different rules that belong to the
family defined, with each rule accounting for the number of good objects and
the number of bad objects in the corresponding sets under comparison, but
differing in the way in which the two numbers are combined.
2 Notation and definitions
We start by defining a dichotomous domain following Brams and Fishburn
(1978). Let X be a universal finite set of objects and R a binary relation
defined on X. We denote the symmetric and asymmetric parts (indifference
and strict preference) of R by I and P , respectively. R is called dichotomous
if there exists a partition (A1, A2) of X, Ai 6= ∅, i = 1, 2, such that aIb holds
for a, b ∈ Ai, i = 1, 2, and aPb holds for a ∈ A1 and b ∈ A2.2
Let X be the set of all subsets of X including the empty set. In our
model, the elements of X are the (alternative) sets of objects that an agent
may be confronted with. The question now arises of how this agent compares
sets using only the information provided by R. Consequently, the problem
to be analyzed is how to establish a binary relation < defined on X . At
this point we assume that < is reflexive and transitive, but not necessarily
complete. When assuming only reflexivity and transitivity we will say that
< is a ranking over the sets, while when assuming that it is also complete
2As the reader can easily check, any dichotomous binary relation is reflexive, complete,
and transitive.
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we will say that it is a complete ranking.3 For all C,D ∈ X , C < D is
interpreted as “C is at least as good as D”. The asymmetric and symmetric
factors of < are denoted by  (“is strictly better than”) and ∼ (“is as good
as”), respectively. We say that < is an extension of R if for x, y ∈ X, xRy
implies {x} < {y}.4
Now let {X} ⊂ X be the set of all singletons in X . We say that < is
based on a dichotomous partition between good and bad singletons, and call
it a gb-ranking, if there exists a partition (A∗1, A
∗
2) of {X}, A∗i 6= ∅, i = 1, 2,
such that {a} ∼ {b} holds for {a}, {b} ∈ A∗i , i = 1, 2, and {a}  ∅  {b}
holds for {a} ∈ A∗1 and {b} ∈ A∗2.
The idea behind a gb-ranking is that of a transitive and reflexive binary
relation over sets where there are two indifference classes of singletons, A∗1
and A∗2. The singletons in A
∗
1 are strictly better than the empty set and
those in A∗2 are strictly worse. Thus, the definition of a gb-ranking enables
the corresponding elements from A∗1 to be interpreted as being “good” and
those from A∗2 as being “bad”. Clearly, by the definition of extension, if R
is dichotomous then it directly induces a dichotomous preference over the
set of singletons. But it is worth mentioning that not every extension < of
a dichotomous preference R is a gb-ranking. The reason here is that if it is
assumed solely that < is an extension of R then it is not known where the
empty set should be placed. Thus, one needs additional requirements such
as those described in the next section so as to induce a gb-ranking over sets
by extending a dichotomous preference R over objects.5
3All the characterization results of the following sections hold for incomplete binary
relations except Theorem 7.
4As Barberà et al. (2004) show in their survey on ranking sets models, this property is
often presented as a minimal axiomatic requirement for extending a preference over a set
of elements to a preference over its possible subsets.
5Notice that if < is an extension of a dichotomous preference R or a gb-ranking, then
it is complete over the set of all singletons in X .
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3 A family of rules
We start our analysis by introducing three axioms that will constitute the
axiomatic core of the results that we propose throughout the sections below.
Local Positive Response (LPR): There exists A ∈ X such that A ∪ {x}  A
for some x ∈ X \ A.
Local Negative Response (LNR): There exists A ∈ X such that A ∪ {x} ≺ A
for some x ∈ X \ A.
Independence (IND): For all A,B ∈ X , and all x ∈ X \ (A ∪ B), A < B ⇔
A ∪ {x} < B ∪ {x}.
Axiom LPR states that a set A and an external element x can always be
found such that A is improved by the addition of x. The adjective “local”
comes from the fact that LPR only requires that there be at least one set such
that, for at least one external element that is added to it, the set becomes
strictly better. This condition is weaker than assuming the existence of what
Barberà et al. (1991), in the context of voting by committees, define as a
“good” element, i.e. an element that, as a singleton, is strictly better than
the empty set. On the other hand, if the degenerate case where the basic
preference defined on X is the universal indifference is disregarded, LPR
is also weaker than condition P in Brams and Fishburn (1978) which, in
a context of approval voting, states that, for x, y ∈ X, {x}  {x, y} 
{y} if and only if xPy. The interpretation and scope of axiom LNR are
straightforward as a dual of LPR. Notice that LRP and LNR can also be
seen as incorporating two natural requirements for < being minimally rich.
On the other hand, IND refers to the effect of adding the same element
to (or dropping it from) a pair of sets A and B. In particular, the axiom
says that the original ranking between the two sets is preserved under such
a modification. This axiom imposes an idea of separability that is widely
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used in ranking sets models under different settings. However it should be
warned that such a separability idea in fact forces the elements in the set not
to have any specific correlation, which in some contexts can be considered as
not very realistic. In some studies this kind of separability idea is expressed
exactly as the axiom that we propose here is (for example, Pattanaik and
Xu (1990) and Bossert et al. (1994) among many others). Other studies use
related properties. For example, IND is a stronger version of the following
separability condition proposed by Barberà et al. (1991): for A ∈ X \ ∅ and
x ∈ X \ A, {x}  ∅ ⇔ A ∪ {x}  A.
Theorem 1 Let R be a dichotomous preference on X and < be an extension
of it. If < satisfies IND, LPR and LNR, then it is a gb-ranking.
As noted above, starting from a dichotomous preference R and merely
extending it does not necessarily lead to a gb-ranking. What can be obtained
is at most a ranking with two indifference classes among the singletons, but
with no connotation of absolute “goodness” or “badness” attachable to them.
Theorem 1 establishes IND, LPR and LNR as sufficient conditions to ensure
that the extension from a dichotomous preference R to a ranking over sets
results in a gb-ranking. The proof, like those of all other results except that
of Theorem 2, is presented in the Appendix.6
Theorem 1 only establishes a logical implication in one direction. As for
the inverse implication, that is, whether any gb-ranking is an extension of a
dichotomous preference R on X and satisfies IND, LPR and LNR, the answer
is yes except with respect to IND. We state this idea formally by means of
the following theorem.
6The proof can also be obtained by substituting IND by the aforesaid weaker condition
of separability from Barberà et al. (1991), but since IND is a core necessary condition in
all the later results we have opted to maintain it so as to preserve the unity of the model.
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Theorem 2 Every gb-ranking satisfies LPR and LNR, and is an extension
of some dichotomous preference R on X.
The proof of Theorem 2 is almost immediately apparent. On the one
hand, a gb-ranking satisfies LPR and LNR because by its mere definition
there are x, y ∈ X such that {x}  ∅  {y}. On the other hand, in order to
prove that there is a dichotomous preference R of which < is an extension,
it suffices to define R by xRy iff {x} < {y}.7
As a matter of fact, each ranking < enables two subsets of X, Xg and Xb,
to be induced such that Xg = {x : {x}  ∅} and Xb = {x : ∅  {x}}. The
interpretation of Xg and Xb is straightforward as the sets of good and bad
objects, respectively. If < is also a gb-ranking, then Xg and Xb constitute a
partition of X and there is indifference between any two singletons containing
good objects and any two singletons containing bad objects. Throughout the
sections below we use the notation Xg and Xb to refer to the subsets of good
and bad elements induced as above. Analogously, for any A ∈ X , we set
Ag = A ∩ Xg and Ab = A ∩ Xb so that (Ag, Ab) is the partition of A into
good and bad elements.
The combination of IND, LPR and LNR also makes it possible to char-
acterize a family of rankings that only computes two numbers in order to
compare any pair of sets, namely the number of good elements that they
contain (evaluated positively) and the number of bad elements (evaluated
negatively).8
7We could have merged Theorems 1 and 2 into the following unique and more compact
“if-and-only-if” result, but at the cost of some logical redundancies: Let < satisfy IND,
LPR, and LNR. Then, < is an extension of a dichotomous preference R over X if and only
if it is a gb-ranking.
8Like Theorem 3, all the theorems and propositions in the next section are stated for
any ranking < that is a gb-ranking. By virtue of Theorem 1, each of these theorems could
be restated to hold for any ranking < “that is an extension of a dichotomous preference
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Theorem 3 Let < be a gb-ranking satisfying IND. Then, for all A,B ∈ X ,
(1) (|Ag| > |Bg|and
∣∣Ab∣∣ < ∣∣Bb∣∣) implies A  B,
(2) (|Ag| ≥ |Bg| and
∣∣Ab∣∣ ≤ ∣∣Bb∣∣) implies A < B.
Considering the definition of “good” and “bad” objects as before, it is
noteworthy that the family characterized in Theorem 3 is a subfamily of the
set of separable preference relations over sets. That is, preferences over sets
where, given an arbitrary set of objects, the addition of a good object to the
set always results in a higher ranked set while the addition of a bad object
results in a lower ranked set.9
The section concludes with three examples that illustrate the indepen-
dence of axioms IND, LPR and LNR. The corresponding ranking in each of
these examples satisfies all the axioms discussed but one.
¬ (IND): Let X = {x, y} and let <1 be defined as follows: {x} ∼1 {x, y} 1
∅ 1 {y}. Clearly, <1 does not satisfy IND since ∅ 1 {y} and {x} ∼1 {x, y}.
In order to see that the other two axioms are satisfied it suffices in their cor-
responding formulations to set A = ∅ and take as added elements x (for
LPR) and y (for LNR).
¬ (LPR): Let X = {x, y} and take <2 to be as follows: {x} ∼2 ∅ 2 {x, y} ∼2
{y}. This ranking satisfies IND since we have, on the one hand, that {x} ∼2 ∅
and {x, y} ∼2 {y}, and on the other hand that ∅ 2 {y} and {x} 2 {x, y}.
Clearly, LNR is fulfilled (take A = ∅ and y as added element) while LPR is
violated since {x, y} ∼2 {y} (A = {y} is ruled out), {x} ∼2 {x, y} (A = {x}
is ruled out), and {x} ∼2 ∅, ∅ 2 {y} (A = ∅ is ruled out).
¬ (LNR): Let X = {x, y} and consider the ranking <3 defined as follows:
R on X and satisfies IND, LPR and LNR”. We have chosen the former formulation for
the sake of fluency.
9Separable preferences are commonly used as a primitive in the analysis of voting
situations (cf. Barberà et al. (1991), Berga et al. (2004), Ju (2003, 2005)) and coalition
formation games (cf. Burani and Zwicker (2003), Dimitrov et al. (2006)).
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{x} ∼3 {x, y} 3 ∅ ∼3 {y}. Following arguments analogous to those for <2,
it is easy to check that <3 satisfies IND and LPR but not LNR.
Notice that <1 is a gb-ranking, while <2 and <3 are not, the reason being
that {x} ∼2 ∅ and ∅ ∼3 {y}.
4 Characterization results
On the basis of the core axioms presented in Section 3, we now provide ax-
iomatic characterizations of several rules that belong to the above described
family.
4.1 Pairwise offsetting
The next axiom imposes the existence of a pair of elements in X that, when
added to a set, make it remain indifferent.
Local Indifference (LI): There exists A ∈ X , and x, y ∈ X \ A such that
A ∪ {x, y} ∼ A.
Like LPR and LNR, LI is an axiom of a “local” nature in the sense that
for it to hold it suffices to find a set A and a pair of elements, x and y, such
that A∪ {x, y} ∼ A. Next we present two propositions that help to suitably
interpret LI.
Proposition 4 Let < be a gb-ranking satisfying IND. If A ∪ {x, y} ∼ A
holds for some A ∈ X and x, y ∈ X \A, then either
[
x ∈ Xg and y ∈ Xb
]
or[
y ∈ Xg and x ∈ Xb
]
.
What Proposition 4 says is that if IND holds then the corresponding pair
of elements added to A should be such that one element is good and the
other one is bad. Proposition 4 then helps to interpret LI as an axiom that,
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when combined with IND, imposes at a certain point in the entire ranking
over sets that a good element and a bad one exactly offset each other. As
shown below, the pair of elements proposed may consist of any good element
and any bad element, provided that LI is combined with IND.
Proposition 5 Let < be a gb-ranking satisfying IND and LI. Then A ∼
A ∪ {x, y} holds for A ∈ X , x ∈ Xg \ A, and y ∈ Xb \ A.
This kind of offsetting between good and bad elements mentioned above
makes sense in many contexts. Imagine, for example, that the problem faced
is to form an assembly, committee or jury of arbitrary size where decisions
are to be taken by majority vote, and “goodness” or “badness” of members
depends on whether they intend to cast their vote against or in favor of
the decision maker’s interests (belonging to a certain party or country, for
example, could be information liable to build up such expectations in some
political assemblies). Similarly, in group formation problems a member of a
group (for example a club) could be willing to accept what he/she considers a
bad new candidate provided that a new good candidate is also accepted. This
could also include the problem of allocating working teams in an organization.
Finally, if sets are interpreted as sets of uncertain (dichotomous) possible
outcomes in a context of complete uncertainty or ignorance (where no infor-
mation about the probabilities or likelihood of the outcomes is available), it
might prove reasonable for the addition of a potentially bad outcome to be
offset by the addition of a potentially good one.
The next theorem shows that IND and LI also serve to characterize the
specific gb-ranking <d (difference rule) defined as follows:10 For all A,B ∈ X ,
A <d B iff |Ag| −
∣∣Ab∣∣ ≥ |Bg| − ∣∣Bb∣∣ .
Theorem 6 A gb-ranking satisfies IND and LI if and only if it is <d.
10See also Dimitrov et al. (2004).
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According to Theorem 6 any gb-ranking that satisfies IND and LI, (or,
alternatively, any extension of a dichotomous preference R over X that sat-
isfies IND, LPR, LNR and LI), necessarily evaluates sets by means of the
difference between the number of good and bad elements.
The following examples show that IND and LI are independent axioms
even within the domain of gb-rankings:
¬ (IND): Let X = {x, y, z} and take the gb-ranking <4 defined as follows:
{x, y} ∼4 {x} ∼4 {y} 4 ∅ 4 {x, y, z} ∼4 {z} ∼4 {y, z} 4 {x, z}. This
ranking does not satisfy IND as {x} ∼4 {y} and {y, z} 4 {x, z}. However,
LI is satisfied since in its formulation we can take A = {z} and check that
{x, y, z} ∼4 {z} holds.
¬ (LI): Let <5 be the gb-ranking defined as follows:
A <5 B iff

∣∣Ab∣∣ < ∣∣Bb∣∣ ,
or∣∣Ab∣∣ = ∣∣Bb∣∣ and |Ag| ≥ |Bg| .
The check for <5 satisfying IND is left to the reader. As for LI, take X =
{x, y} with Xg = {x} and Xb = {y}. Then {x} 5 ∅ 5 {x, y} 5 {y} in
clear violation of LI since no two sets are indifferent.
4.2 Generalized offsetting
Consider the following weaker version of LI.
Weak Local Indifference (WLI): There exist A ∈ X and C ∈ X \ ∅ such that
A ∩ C = ∅ and A ∪ C ∼ A.
The axiom simply says that, for some set A, there exists another separate
set C such that A∪C remains indifferent to A. Clearly this is a weaker version
of LI because it does not require C to consist of two elements. It is not
difficult to obtain results analogous to Propositions 4 and 5 by substituting
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LI by WLI. That is, the set C should contain both good and bad elements,
and it can be replaced by any set D containing the same number of good and
bad elements. As noted in the case of LI, such results make it possible to
think of contexts where the decision maker is willing to accept the addition
of a certain number j of bad elements only if another number of k good
elements is added too. Again, certain group formation problems,or working
team allocation problems could serve as examples.
It also turns out that substituting LI by WLI in Theorem 6 results in
a generalization of the difference rule that considers the weighted difference
between the number of good and bad elements according to a certain set of
admissible weights.11
Theorem 7 A complete gb-ranking < satisfies IND and WLI if and only
if there exist α ∈ {1, 2, ..., |Xb|} and β ∈ {1, 2, ..., |Xg|} such that, for all
A,B ∈ X , A < B ⇔ α |Ag| − β
∣∣Ab∣∣ ≥ α |Bg| − β|Bb|.
As for the independence of axioms IND and WLI in the domain of com-
plete gb-rankings, readers are referred to the examples proposed for Theorem
6. Obviously the example that shows the independence of IND is suitable
because WLI is weaker than LI. As for the independence of WLI, the same
lexicographic rule used to show the independence of LI is also suitable.
4.3 Infection
Imagine a situation where bad elements have the power to infect the good
ones. That is, though there could initially be good and bad elements in a set
the bad feature eventually spreads to all the elements in the set. This could
be the case with disease infections or the transmission of computer viruses for
11This class of rules based on a weighted difference between good and bad elements is a
subclass of another weighted additive rule characterized by Alcantud and Arlegi (2012).
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example. Another possibility in the context of evolutionary games would be
processes where the spread of a negative behavior, such as corrupt practices,
in an “evolutionarily stable strategy” (see Bowles (2004)), thus invading, for
example, a community of honest traders or civil servants. In such situations
the presence of good elements is desirable but it is reasonable to assume that,
given the asymmetry of the infection process (bad elements can infect good
ones but not vice-versa), the elimination of bad elements is the top priority.
Without loss of generality, and for the sake of fluency, we stick to an-
other economically meaningful problem that fits the “infection” dynamics
described above. Consider a simplified repeated public good game where
there are only two possible strategies, i.e. contributing to the public good or
not contributing at all. Good objects are therefore those subjects that follow
the cooperative strategy, while bad objects are the defectors. Experimen-
tal evidence shows that, in general, average contributions decay as rounds
progress in repeated public good games. This is in general true across differ-
ent parameters of the game, as amply demonstrated in the last few decades
of experimental study since the papers by Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984)
and by Kim and Walker (1984).12 It is generally accepted that the coexis-
tence of selfish subjects with selfish-biased conditional cooperators is what
motivates this decay (see Neugebauer et al. (2009), Fischbacher et al. (2001),
Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), Ashley et al. (2010) or de Oliveira et al.
(2013)). Thus, given the particular structure of the public good game, such a
selfish-biased conditional cooperation would lead to a progressive contagion
of the defective strategy.
In this context, it is not difficult to imagine situations where one might
12As a matter of fact, Suleiman and Rapoport (1992) find that the defective strategy
spreads more easily in repeated public good games where strategies are dichotomous (full
contribution or no contribution at all), which are precisely those that best fit our model,
than in the case of more general strategies.
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be interested in evaluating, comparing or ranking possible sets of objects
(subjects in our example). For instance, a supervisor may be interested in
designing working teams, or in a coalitional game, an entering player may be
interested in evaluating possible coalitions to enter (for example in a joint
venture).
All the axioms in Section 3 (IND, LPR and LNR) make sense under this
new class of problems: LPR (LNR) would just say that there exist some
group where the inclusion of a cooperative (defector) individual is desirable
(undesirable). And IND would say that if a set of players, A, is considered to
be better than another set of players, B, then adding or dropping a coopera-
tive (defector) individual in both sets should not affect the original ranking.
But the particularity of the problem enables a new axiom to be presented
and discussed that is also reasonable.
Elimination of Bad Elements (EL): Let A,B ∈ X and C ⊆ A be such that
C 6= ∅ with ∅  {c} for each c ∈ C. Then for D ∈ X , A < B ⇒ A \ C 
B ∪D.
Roughly speaking, EL states that if a set A is declared to be better than
another set B, then the positive effect of removing bad elements from the
better set prevails over the addition of any set of elements to the worse set.
Thus, the new reduced set (with less bad alternatives) is strictly better than
the new enlarged set.
In other words, what EL expresses is that adding new elements to the
worse set B (a set of new players, either cooperators or defectors, or new
people to a group, either healthy or infected) can never offset the fact that
bad elements (defectors or infected subjects, for example), which have the
power to contaminate any good element are removed from the set that was
already better before their elimination.
As shown below, the replacement of LI by EL in Theorem 6 results in
the characterization of the bad-elements-priority rule <bp which is another
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specific gb-ranking. More precisely, for all A,B ∈ X ,
A <bp B iff

∣∣Ab∣∣ < ∣∣Bb∣∣ ,
or∣∣Ab∣∣ = ∣∣Bb∣∣ and |Ag| ≥ |Bg| .
Clearly, <bp is a lexicographic gb-ranking as it first pays attention to the
number of “bad” elements in each of the sets under comparison and, in case
of a tie, checks for the corresponding numbers of “good” elements.
Theorem 8 A gb-ranking satisfies IND and EL if and only if it is <bp.
In order to demonstrate the independence of IND and EL, consider the
following two examples:
¬(IND): Take X = {x, y, z} and again consider the gb-ranking <4 defined
above as follows: {x, y} ∼4 {x} ∼4 {y} 4 ∅ 4 {x, y, z} ∼4 {z} ∼4
{y, z} 4 {x, z}. As already known, <4 does not satisfy IND. In order
to check that EL is fulfilled, notice that all sets containing the only “bad”
element z (and thus, the only possible candidates to play the role of A in the
formulation of EL) are strictly worse than the empty set. Moreover, by re-
moving z from any of them sets are obtained that are all strictly better than
the empty set, while adding any additional elements to them always results
in sets still containing z. Thus, it can be concluded that EL is satisfied.
¬(EL): Let <6 be the gb-ranking defined as follows:
A <6 B iff

|Ag| > |Bg| ,
or
|Ag| = |Bg| and
∣∣Ab∣∣ ≤ ∣∣Bb∣∣ .
As in the case of <5, checking that <6 satisfies IND is easy and is left to the
reader. In order to see that EL is violated, take X = {x, y} with Xg = {x}
and Xb = {y}. It then holds that {x} 6 {x, y} 6 ∅ 6 {y}. By EL,
{x, y} 6 ∅ should imply {x} 6 {x}, a contradiction.
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4.4 Opportunity sets
Sets can also be interpreted as opportunity sets. Consider a situation where
the decision maker has the power to select one of the elements in the set. In
other words, alternatives are mutually exclusive and it is the decision maker
who determines the final outcome. As a consequence, if there are both good
and bad elements in the set, the decision maker always has the possibility of
not choosing the bad ones.
Moreover, assume that the decision maker has a preference for freedom
of choice. This means that, independently of which alternative is finally
chosen, the availability of others has, for some reason, some value for the
decision maker. In particular, Sen (1988) distinguishes two kinds of reason
why freedom of choice is valuable. On the one hand, freedom of choice
may have an instrumental, or consequentialist, value, meaning that having
more opportunities from which to choose is a way of achieving something
(for example, greater indirect utility, or the development of human faculties
by the exercise of choosing). On the other hand, as discussed by Sen (1988,
1991) and Sugden (1998), freedom of choice may also have an intrinsic value,
according to which the mere availability of alternatives to choose from has a
value as an end in its own right, independently of any other goal that they
may help to achieve.
The paradigm of a ranking of opportunity sets that is based uniquely on
an intrinsic value of freedom of choice is the cardinalist ranking, axiomati-
cally characterized by Pattanaik and Xu (1990), where sets are ordered sim-
ply according to their number of alternatives, whatever the quality of those
alternatives is. Later papers such as Bossert et al. (1994) characterize rules
that are compatible with the assumption of an intrinsic value of freedom of
choice but also consider the quality of alternatives and the indirect utility
that the set may provide, that is, both the intrinsic and the instrumental
value of freedom of choice are considered.
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Next we propose an axiom that makes full sense under both the intrinsic
and the instrumental assumptions about the value of freedom of choice.
Enlargement with Good Elements (EN): Let A,B ∈ X and C ⊆ X \ A
be such that C 6= ∅ with {c}  ∅ for each c ∈ C. Then for D ∈ X ,
A < B ⇒ A ∪ C  B \D.
In words, and considering the freedom of choice context in which the ax-
iom is proposed, this means that if one set A provides (weakly) more freedom
of choice than another set B then the addition of further good elements to
A will make it strictly better than any subset of B in terms of freedom.
Clearly, EN is suitable in an environment where freedom of choice has
an intrinsic value. From this perspective, any enlargement of a set should
involve an increase of the intrinsic freedom that it provides for the simple
reason that there are more opportunities to choose from. Therefore, if A < B
any proper superset of A would contain a greater intrinsic freedom of choice
than any subset of B.
But if, following Bossert et al. (1994), it is believed that quality should
also be valuable, EN is still suitable because the enlargement of A takes place
exclusively with good options.
A meaningful special situation where freedom of choice has an instrumen-
tal value is the so-called preference for flexibility problem (see Kreps (1979)
for the first axiomatic foundation of the concept of flexibility, also Arlegi and
Nieto (2001a, 2001b), and Ahn and Sarver (2013) among many others). In
such a situation the decision is made in two stages. In the first an opportu-
nity set is preselected (or evaluated), and in the second the final alternative is
picked from the previously preselected set. Moreover, although the decision
maker could have preferences defined over the alternatives at the first step
they are not definite, so his/her own final preferences when the final choice
has to be made are uncertain for him/her in the first stage. As a conse-
quence, the decision maker would like to maintain more alternatives in the
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first stage decision process as long as this helps to dissipate the uncertainty
about the preferences in the second stage. More precisely, the availability of
alternatives at the first stage of the decision process is valuable in that they
could be maximal for some admissible configuration of the future preferences.
For example, imagine that in the first stage the Health System determines
the set of potential candidates for a transplant of a recently received organ
based uniquely on the compatibility of their blood types. The final objective
is to minimize the probability of rejection, and the final decision depends
on tests to be conducted on the shortlisted candidates. In this case, any
candidate with the compatible blood type adds flexibility to the set to be
preselected. Another example would be that of a vegetarian who has to make
a reservation at a restaurant some days in advance based on the menu that
the restaurant offers, but who is not sure about his/her particular preferences
so many days in advance. In this case (assuming that, in principle, he/she
is willing to eat any kind of vegetarian food) the presence of any vegetarian
dish in the menu adds flexibility to his/her choice.
The same structure applies to problems where an agent has to select a set
of alternatives for another agent, who takes the final decision, and the former
is not certain about the latter’s preferences. For example, a human resources
company that has to shortlist candidates for a firm which will eventually hire
one of them after a personal interview.
Our assumption of prior dichotomous information fits well into preference
for flexibility problems. It is reasonable to consider contexts where, in the
first stage, the decision maker is only able to discriminate between accept-
able and non acceptable alternatives (blood-type compatible patients for a
transplant, vegetarian dishes or job candidates with a certain qualification).
It is thus clear that adding new “acceptable” alternatives to a set A
increases the value of the set in terms of flexibility (there are more chances
for the enlarged set to contain a potential maximal alternative). Meanwhile,
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no subset of a set B can provide more flexibility than B. Consequently EN
becomes compelling: if A < B, and C consists only of acceptable alternatives,
A ∪ C  B \D for any set D.
In combination with IND, axiom EN enables a lexicographic gb-ranking
to be characterized that is dual with respect to <bp. We call it the good-
elements-priority rule, denote it by <gp, and define it as follows. For all
A,B ∈ X ,
A <gp B iff

|Ag| > |Bg| ,
or
|Ag| = |Bg| and
∣∣Ab∣∣ ≤ ∣∣Bb∣∣ .
Theorem 9 A gb-ranking satisfies IND and EN if and only if it is <gp.
The theorem says that in a dichotomous environment the good-elements-
priority rule is characterized by combining EN and IND.
An important remark is in order regarding Theorem 9. We have claimed
that EN fits well with both the intrinsic and the instrumental value of freedom
of choice. However, Theorem 9 incorporates two assumptions besides EN:
The first is IND, which in principle is not inconsistent with either view about
the value of freedom of choice. The second is that the rule characterized is
a gb-ranking which, by Theorem 2, implies that it satisfies LNR. This axiom
could in fact come into conflict with the assumption of an intrinsic value
of freedom of choice because from a purist view even the addition of a bad
alternative increases the possible choices of the decision maker. Consequently
we tend to believe that the combination of all the assumptions in Theorem
9 is more suitable under the instrumental consideration of freedom.
Moreover, according to <gp, not only are bad alternatives disregarded to
evaluate sets but they are also evaluated negatively. Again this is mainly as
a consequence of LNR, and suggests that the rule fits in contexts where the
consideration of an instrumental value of freedom of choice is accompanied by
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a cost for the presence of bad alternatives in the set. For instance, the cost of
conducting the final medical tests on the potential receivers of a transplant,
the cost of the final personal interviews for the firm in the job candidates case,
or the cost of ignoring the non-vegetarian dishes in the restaurant example.
However, the interpretation of the sets as opportunity sets is not the
only one under which the good-elements-priority rule may make sense. Com-
ing back to the example of repeated public good games, processes can be
imagined that are opposite to those of infection as described in the pre-
vious section. For example certain institutional arrangements such as the
implementation of adequate structures of punishment13 or the internaliza-
tion of social norms14 may induce the presence of conditional cooperators
to a spread of the cooperative strategy, inverse to the infection of defective
strategies proposed in the previous section. Also, evolutionary game theory
is able to explain the potential for “good” behaviors to spread in a popula-
tion. For example, Bowles (2004) mentions the expansion in certain tribal
communities in Africa of the rejection of ablation.
We finish this section by providing two examples that prove the indepen-
dence of axioms IND and EN.
¬(IND): Let X = {x, y} and take the gb-ranking <1 defined above as follows:
{x} ∼1 {x, y} 1 ∅ 1 {y}. As already shown, <1 violates IND. Axiom EN
is satisfied since, given that there is a unique good element x, the only sets
that can play the role of A in the formulation of EN are ∅ and {y}. By
adding x to ∅ it results that both {x} 1 {y} and {x} 1 ∅. By adding x to
{y} it results that both {x, y}  {y} and {x, y}  ∅. Thus, EN is fulfilled in
all the instances where it applies.
¬(EN): Take the gb-ranking <bp. By Theorem 8 we know that it satisfies
13See, for example, Fehr and Gächter (2000), Gürerk et al. (2006), Rockenbach and
Milinski (2006), or Gächter et al. (2008).
14See, for example, Masclet et al. (2003) and Bochet et al. (2006).
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IND. In order to check that EN is violated, again take X = {x, y} with
Xg = {x} and Xb = {y}. This results in {x} bp ∅ bp {x, y} bp {y}. By
EN, ∅ bp {x, y} should imply {x} bp {x}, a contradiction.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper aims to contribute to the general body of literature about “rank-
ing sets of objects”. In particular, starting from a situation where the agent
makes a dichotomous partition of the elements of a given set X, we study
the problem of extending this information axiomatically to obtain rankings
over the power set of X. There is a wide variety of interpretations that can
be given to this formal problem, and how it is solved depends very much
upon the particular interpretation adopted. We propose three axioms (In-
dependence (IND), Local Positive Responsiveness (LPR) and Local Negative
Responsiveness (LNR)) that we believe are suitable under all the possible
interpretations that we have considered.
First, those three axioms enable two start-up results to be obtained: on
the one hand they enable the dichotomous partition to be reinterpreted as
made in terms of good and bad elements, and on the other hand they char-
acterize a family of rules for evaluating sets that considers as relevant only
the information about the number of good elements and the number of bad
elements in those sets, and computes the former positively and the latter
negatively.
Secondly, the three axioms constitute the axiomatic core of more particu-
lar axiomatic characterizations performed upon more specific interpretations
of the problem. When they are combined with Local Indifference (LI) the
difference rule is obtained; when they are combined with Weak Local Indiffer-
ence (WLI) the resulting rule is a weighted difference rule; if LI is replaced by
Elimination of Bad Elements (EL) the bad-elements-priority rule is obtained
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and if instead Enlargement with Good Elements (EN) is used the result is a
dual rule, the good-elements-priority rule.
The axioms of a “local” nature (LPR, LNR, LI and WLI) that we propose
are certainly weak in that they only require the existence of a set and an
element (or pair of elements) such that the corresponding property holds.
However, together with IND, they enable highly structured characterizations
to be obtained. Thus, our results reveal that axiom IND, which at a first
sight may seem a rather innocuous technical axiom of separability, and one
that is widely used in the literature on ranking sets, in fact imposes much
more structure than it initially seems to do. The basic reason is that the
axiom rules out any kind of correlation between the elements in a set. One
might think about weaker versions of IND that palliate this inconvenience,
e.g. using only one-direction implications or the strict preference instead
of the weak one. Our main finding in this respect is that such weakenings
immediately lead to very unstructured and not very meaningful families of
rules, unless other parts of the assumptions in the model are reinforced.
Interestingly, it is not difficult to prove that our results are still valid if we
use a weaker version of IND (A < B ⇔ A ∪ {x}  B ∪ {x}), provided
that the focus is on complete binary relations only. Finally, the one-direction
implication version (A  B ⇒ A∪{x}  B∪{x}) of IND would enable some
of the results to be obtained only if combined with the additional assumption
that A ∼ (A \ {x}) ∪ {y} holds for any A ∈ X , x ∈ A, and y ∈ X \ A with
{x} ∼ {y}.
We now briefly describe how our model relates to the work of Alcantud
and Arlegi (2012). It is worth mentioning that Alcantud and Arlegi (2012)
also assume a certain categorization among the primitive items in terms of
“good”, “neutral”, and “bad”, and characterize a weighted additive rule. But
there are major differences between the two approaches: To start with, we
take a step back in our primitive assumptions in the sense that our starting
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point is just a dichotomous partition of the items à la Brams and Fishburn
(1978), with no associated connotations of goodness, neutrality or badness.
Secondly, the axioms and results are different. For example, in the current
article we introduce, as new characterization results, those of the family of
rules in Theorem 3 and the two lexicographic rules. As for the family of
weighted additive rules that we characterize in Theorem 7, it is a subclass
of the family characterized by Alcantud and Arlegi (2012) in two senses. On
the one hand, Alcantud and Arlegi’s general rule includes the lexicographic
rules, which are not included in the family characterized in Theorem 7. On
the other hand, our additive rule only allows the weights α and β to take
certain particular values (those expressed in the statement of Theorem 7)
while Alcantud and Arlegi’s rule allows α and β to take any real value. A
consequence of this is that in Alcantud and Arlegi’s family there are rules
that satisfy IND but do not satisfy WLI.
Finally, our model performs an axiomatic analysis based on a partition of
the set of objects that, though plausible, is certainly elementary. A natural
step forward in this research is to further define the structure of the decision
maker’s information about the alternatives. For instance, the simple infor-
mation structure described in this paper could be enriched by embedding a
similarity relation (cf. Pattanaik and Xu (2000)) into the sets of good and
bad objects. This would enable different subgroups of good (bad) objects to
be discriminated and would also enable extensions to the rules characterized
here to be considered.
6 Appendix
This section sets out the proofs of all the theorems that appear in the text.
In what follows, for all S ∈ X and all k ∈ {1, . . . , |S|}, (S)k denotes any
subset of S whose cardinality is k.
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Proof of Theorem 1. We have to prove that if < is an extension of a
dichotomous preference R over X and satisfies LPR, LNR and IND, then <
is a gb-ranking. To do this it must be proved that there exists a partition
(A∗1, A
∗
2) of {X}, A∗i 6= ∅, i = 1, 2, such that {a} ∼ {b} holds for {a}, {b} ∈
A∗i , i = 1, 2, and {a}  ∅  {b} holds for {a} ∈ A∗1 and {b} ∈ A∗2.
Set R as above and let < be an extension of it. For i = 1, 2, let A∗i =
{{a} : a ∈ Ai 6= ∅} and notice that (A∗1, A∗2) is a partition of {X} as required.
Since < is an extension of R, {a} ∼ {b} holds for {a} , {b} ∈ A∗i , i = 1, 2, and
{a}  {b} holds for {a} ∈ A∗1 and {b} ∈ A∗2. Notice further that, by LPR,
there are A ∈ X , a ∈ X \A such that A ∪ {a}  A, which by applying IND
repeatedly implies {a}  ∅. Similarly, by LNR, there are B ∈ X , b ∈ X \ B
such that B  B ∪ {b}, which by applying IND repeatedly implies ∅  {b}.
It can be concluded that {a} ∈ A∗1 and {b} ∈ A∗2 should hold. Applying
transitivity of < as many times as necessary, leads to {a′}  ∅  {b′} which
holds for any {a′} ∈ A∗1 and {b′} ∈ A∗2.
Before presenting the proof of Theorem 3, we first prove the following
four lemmas.
Lemma 10 If < satisfies IND, then A ∼ (A \ {x}) ∪ {y} holds for A ∈ X ,
x ∈ A, and y ∈ X \ A with {x} ∼ {y}.
Proof of Lemma 10. By {x} ∼ {y} the repeated application of IND results
in (A \ {x}) ∪ {x} ∼ (A \ {x}) ∪ {y}. Thus, A ∼ (A \ {x}) ∪ {y}.
Lemma 11 If < satisfies IND, then for all A,B ∈ X , x ∈ X \ A, and
y ∈ X \B with {x} ∼ {y}, we have that A < B ⇔ A ∪ {x} < B ∪ {y}.
Proof of Lemma 11. We start by showing that A < B implies A ∪ {x} <
B ∪ {y}. To that end assume first that x, y ∈ X \ (A ∪ B). If A < B, then,
by IND it holds that A∪{x} < B∪{x} and A∪{y} < B∪{y} holds. Given
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that {x} ∼ {y}, applying IND repeatedly gives A ∪ {x} ∼ A ∪ {y}. Thus,
by transitivity, A ∪ {x} < B ∪ {y}.
Assume next that x ∈ B and y ∈ A. By Lemma 10, (A \ {y})∪ {x} ∼ A
and (B \ {x}) ∪ {y} ∼ B. Thus, assuming A < B and applying transitivity
gives (A \ {y}) ∪ {x} < B. By IND x can be removed from both sets,
which gives us A \ {y} < B \ {x}. Now it emerges that x, y /∈ (A \ {y})
and x, y /∈ (B \ {x}). IND can be applied twice, first with x and secondly
with y to obtain (A \ {y}) ∪ {x} ∪ {y} < (B \ {x}) ∪ {x} ∪ {y}, that is,
A ∪ {x} < B ∪ {y}.
Consider now the case where x ∈ B and y /∈ A. If A < B, then by Lemma
10 it results that (B \ {x}) ∪ {y} ∼ B holds. Therefore, by transitivity,
A < (B \ {x})∪{y}, and by IND, A∪{x} < B ∪{y}. The proof for the last
case with y ∈ A and x /∈ B is analogous.
What remains to be shown is the reverse implication of the statement,
i.e., that A ∪ {x} < B ∪ {y} implies A < B. Two cases can be distinguised:
(i) y ∈ A and x ∈ B, and (ii) y /∈ A or x /∈ B.
(i) Assume that y ∈ A and x ∈ B. Then, by IND, A ∪ {x} < B ∪ {y}
implies that (A\y)∪{x} < B. Again by IND, the latter implies A\{y} < B\
{x}, and applying IND one more time gives (A\{y})∪{y} < (B\{x})∪{y}).
Since, by Lemma 10, B ∼ (B \ {x}) ∪ {y}), it results by transitivity that
A < B holds.
(ii) Assume first that y /∈ A. Since {x} ∼ {y}, it follows by the repeated
use of IND that A∪{x} ∼ A∪{y}. Then, by transitivity, A∪{x} < B∪{y}
implies A ∪ {y} < B ∪ {y} and thus, A < B follows by IND. The proof for
the case where x /∈ B is analogous.
Lemma 12 If a gb-ranking < satisfies IND, then B ∪ E  B holds for
B ∈ X and E ⊆ Xg \B, E 6= ∅.
Proof of Lemma 12. Take <, B, and E as above and let E = {e1, . . . , en}.
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Given that e1 ∈ Xg, {e1}  ∅. Thus, B∪{e1}  B holds by the repeated use
of IND. Applying the same argument (n− 1) more times gives B ∪E  B.
Lemma 13 If a gb-ranking < satisfies IND, then B ∪ E ≺ B holds for
B ∈ X and E ⊆ Xb \B, E 6= ∅.
Proof of Lemma 13. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 12.
Proof of Theorem 3. (1) Assume that |Ag| > |Bg| and
∣∣Ab∣∣ < ∣∣Bb∣∣. If
|Bg| = 0 (i.e., Bg = ∅), Ag  ∅ follows from Lemma 12 with Ag in the role
of E, i.e., the result is Ag  Bg. If |Bg| = s > 0, starting from ∅ ∼ ∅, the
application of Lemma 11 s-times results in (Ag)s ∼ Bg. Lemma 12, with
Ag \ (Ag)s in the role of E, gives Ag  (Ag)s. This, by transitivity, results in
Ag  Bg. Therefore, whether Bg 6= ∅ or Bg = ∅, the result is that Ag  Bg.
By Lemma 13 and
∣∣Bb∣∣ > 0 (i.e., Bb 6= ∅), it holds that Bg  B. If
Ab = ∅, then by transitivity A  B. Assume now that
∣∣Ab∣∣ = v > 0.

















and by transitivity, A  B.
(2) The case in which |Ag| > |Bg| and
∣∣Ab∣∣ < ∣∣Bb∣∣ is proved in the
previous paragraph. Thus, the three remaining possible cases can be distin-
guished:
(2.1) |Ag| > |Bg| and
∣∣Ab∣∣ = ∣∣Bb∣∣,
(2.2) |Ag| = |Bg| and
∣∣Ab∣∣ < ∣∣Bb∣∣, and
(2.3) |Ag| = |Bg| and
∣∣Ab∣∣ = ∣∣Bb∣∣.
(2.1) As in the first part of the proof, it can be proved by using reflexivity,
Lemma 11 and Lemma 12, that Ag  Bg. By Lemma 11 repeated
∣∣Ab∣∣ =∣∣Bb∣∣-times, A  B.
(2.2) Let
∣∣Ab∣∣ = u ≥ 0. By reflexivity, ∅ ∼ ∅, and applying Lemma
















 Bb. By transitivity, Ab  Bb. Applying Lemma 11 |Ag| = |Bg|-
times, A  B.
(2.3) By reflexivity, ∅ ∼ ∅, and applying Lemma 11 |Ag| = |Bg|-times,
Ag ∼ Bg. Again by Lemma 11 applied
∣∣Ab∣∣ = ∣∣Bb∣∣-times, A ∼ B.
Proof of Proposition 4. Notice that it is not possible for both x and y to
belong to Xg, because in that case, A ∪ {x, y}  A would follow by Lemma
12. Similarly, by Lemma 13, it is impossible for both x and y to belong to
Xb.
Proof of Proposition 5. Take A, x ∈ Xg \ A, and y ∈ Xb \ A, as in the
statement of the proposition. By LI it is known that there is a set B ∈ X
and a pair of elements c, d ∈ X \B such that B∪{c, d} ∼ B. By Proposition
4 either [c ∈ Xg and d ∈ Xb] or [d ∈ Xg and c ∈ Xb]. W.l.o.g., let c ∈ Xg
and d ∈ Xb. By IND repeatedly applied, {c, d} ∼ ∅. Since c, x ∈ Xg and
d, y ∈ Xb, it results by the definition of a gb-ranking that both {c} ∼ {x}
and {d} ∼ {y} hold. By Lemma 11, {c, d} ∼ {x, y} and by transitivity,
{x, y} ∼ ∅. Finally, by IND repeatedly applied, A ∼ A∪ {x, y} is reached.
In order to prove Theorem 6, consider first the following lemma.
Lemma 14 If a gb-ranking < satisfies IND and LI, then A ∼ B holds for
A,B ∈ X such that A ∩ E = ∅ and B = A ∪ E for some E ∈ X with
|Eg| =
∣∣Eb∣∣.
Proof of Lemma 14. By the repeated application of Proposition 5.
Proof of Theorem 6. It can be easily checked that <d satisfies IND and
LI. Assume now that a gb-ranking < satisfies IND and LI. It has to be proved
that, for all A,B ∈ X ,
(1) |Ag| −
∣∣Ab∣∣ > |Bg| − ∣∣Bb∣∣ implies A  B, and
(2) |Ag| − |Ag| = |Bg| −
∣∣Bb∣∣ implies A ∼ B.
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Let |Ag| = r, |Bg| = s,
∣∣Ab∣∣ = u, ∣∣Bb∣∣ = v.
(1) In this case r−u > s−v. Consider the following three possible cases:
(1.1) r > u and s > v,
(1.2) r > u and s ≤ v,
(1.3) r ≤ u and s < v.
(1.1) Assume that r > u and s > v. By reflexivity, ∅ ∼ ∅. By Lemma 14,
(Ag)u ∪ Ab ∼ ∅. Also by Lemma 14, (Bg)v ∪ Bb ∼ ∅. Thus, by transitivity,
(Ag)u ∪ Ab ∼ (Bg)v ∪ Bb. Given that r − u > s − v, by Lemma 11 applied
(s− v)-times (Ag)u+s−v ∪Ab ∼ (Bg)v+s−v ∪Bb, i.e., (Ag)u+s−v ∪Ab ∼ B. By
Lemma 12, A  (Ag)u+s−v ∪ Ab, and by transitivity, A  B.
(1.2) Let r > u and s ≤ v. Proceeding as in case (1.1), by reflexivity,
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= B. In any case, by transitivity, A  B.
(1.3) Let r ≤ u and s < v. As before, by reflexivity, Lemma 14 and










. Since r − u > s − v, then



















Then, by transitivity, A  B.
(2) In this case r − u = s − v. If r ≥ u (s ≥ v), then, as in case (1), by
reflexivity, Lemma 14 and transitivity the following is obtained:
(Ag)u ∪ A
b ∼ (Bg)v ∪B
b,
and by Lemma 11 applied (r − u)(= s− v)-times, A ∼ B.
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and by Lemma 11 applied (u− r)(= v − s)-times, A ∼ B.
Proof of Theorem 7. We first show that any complete gb-ranking satisfying
IND and WLI satisfies the two axioms given below, and then utilize a result
in Alcantud and Arlegi (2012) in order to complete our proof. The two new
axioms are the following:
Symmetry within categories (SWC) For a, b ∈ X, if ({a}  ∅ and {b}  ∅)
or (∅  {a} and ∅  {b}), then {a} ∼ {b}.
Independence (IN) For A,B,C,D ∈ X such that (A∪B)∩ (C ∪D) = ∅ and
C ∼ D, A < B if and only if A ∪ C < B ∪D.
Notice that any gb-ranking satisfies SWC by its very definition. As shown
in the next lemma, axioms IND and IN are equivalent.
Lemma 15 A ranking satisfies IND if and only if it satisfies IN.
Proof of Lemma 15. Assume first that < satisfies IND. It has to be proved
that it also satisfies IN, that is, for A,B,C,D ∈ X such that (A∪B)∩ (C ∪
D) = ∅ and C ∼ D, A < B if and only if A ∪ C < B ∪ D. Assume
first that A < B. By IND repeatedly applied A ∪ C < B ∪ C. Moreover,
given that C ∼ D, applying repeatedly IND it can also be obtained that
B ∪ C ∼ B ∪ D. Then, by transitivity, A ∪ C < B ∪ D. In order to prove
the inverse implication, assume now that A∪C < B ∪D. We know by IND
that B ∪ C ∼ B ∪D. Therefore, by transitivity A ∪ C < B ∪ C, and again
applying IND repeatedly A < B is obtained.
Assume next that < satisfies IN. Take A,B ∈ X and x ∈ X \ (A ∪ B)
as in the formulation of IND. By setting C = D = {x} and noticing that
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{x} ∩ (A ∪ B) = ∅, IN can be applied to conclude that A < B holds if and
only if A ∪ {x} < B ∪ {x} as was to be proved.
Hence, for any complete gb-ranking satisfying IND the following result
(Theorem 4.6 in Alcantud and Arlegi (2012)) applies.
Theorem (Alcantud and Arlegi (2012)) A complete ranking < satisfies IN
and SWC if and only if there exist α, β ∈ R++ such that for all A,B ∈ X ,
A < B ⇔ α |Ag| − β
∣∣Ab∣∣ ≥ α |Bg| − β|Bb|.
We finally show that if, additionally, < satisfies WLI, α ∈ {1, 2, ...,
∣∣Xb∣∣}
and β ∈ {1, 2, ..., |Xg|}. By WLI it is known that there are A ∈ X and
C ∈ X \ ∅ such that A ∩ C = ∅ and A ∪ C ∼ A. By IND repeatedly
applied this implies C ∼ ∅. Since C 6= ∅, it follows in view of Lemma 12
and Lemma 13 that C ∼ ∅ is only possible if there are x, y ∈ C such that
{x}  ∅ and ∅  {y}. By Theorem 4.6 in Alcantud and Arlegi (2012), C ∼ ∅
implies α |Cg| − β
∣∣Cb∣∣ = 0 which holds if α = |Cb| and β = |Cg|. Obviously,∣∣Cb∣∣ ∈ {1, 2, ..., |Xb|} and |Cg| ∈ {1, 2, ..., |Xg|}. This completes the proof of
the sufficient part of Theorem 7.
To prove the necessary part of the theorem it must be checked that if < is a
complete gb-ranking and there are α ∈ {1, 2, ..., |Xb|} and β ∈ {1, 2, ..., |Xg|}
such that, for all A,B ∈ X , A < B ⇔ α |Ag| − β
∣∣Ab∣∣ ≥ α |Bg| − β|Ab|, then
< satisfies IND and WLI. The fulfillment of IND follows directly from the
additive structure of the rule. As for WLI, note that there is always a set C
such that |Cg| = β and
∣∣Cb∣∣ = α. This means that α |Cg| − β ∣∣Cb∣∣ = 0 and
thus, C ∼ ∅ holds. Hence, there are A ∈ X (A = ∅) and C ∈ X \∅ such that
A ∩ C = ∅ and A ∪ C ∼ A, as required for WLI to hold.
Proof of Theorem 8. It is not difficult to check that <bp satisfies the two
axioms. Assume now that a gb-ranking < satisfies IND and EL. It must be
proved that, for all A,B ∈ X ,
(1)
∣∣Ab∣∣ < ∣∣Bb∣∣ implies A  B,
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(2) (
∣∣Ab∣∣ = ∣∣Bb∣∣ and |Ag| > |Bg|) implies A  B, and
(3) (
∣∣Ab∣∣ = ∣∣Bb∣∣ and |Ag| = |Bg|) implies A ∼ B.
(1) Let
∣∣Ab∣∣ = k and ∣∣Bb∣∣ = k + j, with j ≥ 1. By reflexivity Bb % Bb
and by EL (Bb)k  Bb ∪Bg, that is, (Bb)k  B. By Theorem 3 Ab ∼ (Bb)k,
therefore, by transitivity Ab  B. If Ag = ∅, then A  B as desired. If
Ag 6= ∅ then A  Ab by Lemma 12, and by transitivity A  B.
(2) Let |Ag| > |Bg| = s. By Theorem 3, Ab ∪ (Ag)s ∼ B. By Lemma 12,
A  Ab ∪ (Ag)s, and by transitivity, A  B.
(3) Again by Theorem 3, A ∼ B.
Proof of Theorem 9. It is not difficult to check that <gp satisfies the two
axioms. Assume now that a gb-ranking < satisfies IND and EN. It must be
proved that, for all A,B ∈ X ,
(1) |Ag| > |Bg| implies A  B,
(2) (|Ag| = |Bg| and
∣∣Ab∣∣ < ∣∣Bb∣∣) implies A  B, and
(3) (|Ag| = |Bg| and
∣∣Ab∣∣ = ∣∣Bb∣∣) implies A ∼ B.
(1) Let |Bg| = k and |Ag| = k + j. Three possibilities are considered:
First, if
∣∣Ab∣∣ < ∣∣Bb∣∣, by Theorem 3, A  B. Second, if ∣∣Ab∣∣ = ∣∣Bb∣∣, then
by Theorem 3, Ab ∪ (Ag)k ∼ B. By Lemma 12, A  Ab ∪ (Ag)k, and by
transitivity, A  B.
Thirdly, assume that
∣∣Ab∣∣ > ∣∣Bb∣∣. Let n = ∣∣Ab∣∣− ∣∣Bb∣∣. Then it is known
that there exists a nonempty set {a1, . . . , an} ⊂ Ab \ Bb. By construction
and Theorem 3 (Ag)k ∪ Ab ∼ B ∪ {a1, . . . , an}, and by applying EN A  B
is obtained.
Notice finally that the implications in cases (2) and (3) follow from The-
orem 3 and the transitivity of <.
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